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THE VILLAGE OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS:
EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE
SUBURBAN ZONE
By Robert J. Lotero*
Municipal zoning practices in the United States have been charac-
terized as one of the factors contributing to the pervasive racial and
economic segregation between urban centers and their suburbs.1 This
characterization raises the question whether suburban zoning ordinances and
their application sometimes violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 Although some state courts3 and lower federal courts4
have addressed this socially significant issue, not until 1977 did the United
States Supreme Court consider the possibility that a zoning ordinance might
be racially discriminatory. 5
* Member, second year class.
1. Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death
Knell for Home Rule?, I TOL. L. REV. 65, 74-80 (1969); Branfinan, Cohen & Trubeck,
Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Patterns of the
Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483, 484-85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Branfman]; see Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
2. See Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments] for an oft-quoted discussion of equal protection
doctrine.
3. See, e.g., Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal.
App. 3d 488, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1973); Malmar Assocs. v. Board of County Comm'rs,
260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6 (1971); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808
(1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975); In re
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
4. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v.
City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City
of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey
v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Organizations v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Ybarra v. Town of
Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal.), afftd, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. The landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), involved a substantive due process challenge of zoning, as did Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). In two later equal protection zoning challenges, the
Supreme Court denied an alleged infringement of fundamental interests in one, Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), and dismissed the other for lack of standing to
sue, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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The equal protection issue was squarely presented to the Supreme
Court in the case of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.' This note, after discussing the decisions of the district
court and court of appeals, analyzes the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in rejecting this equal protection challenge. The Court's requirement
that the plaintiff prove discriminatory purpose, the mechanics of determin-
ing purpose, and the Court's review of the evidence to determine if plaintiffs
had met the requirements are discussed first. Next, the note presents alterna-
tives less burdensome to plaintiffs than the requirement of proof of dis-
criminatory purpose. The author concludes that the Court has unfortunately
insulated zoning practices from strict scrutiny under equal protection
analysis.
I. The District and Circuit Court Decisions:
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights
The Village of Arlington Heights is a Chicago suburb of over 60,000
residents of whom, as of 1970, twenty-seven were black.' Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation (MHDC), a nonprofit organization
formed to construct low and moderate cost housing, obtained a purchase
option on fifteen acres of land in the village on which it proposed to develop
a federally subsidized town house project that would be racially integrated.
Because the site, like the surrounding area, was zoned for single family
dwellings, MHDC petitioned the village to have the property rezoned for the
intended multiple family use.
When the village Board of Trustees followed the recommendation of
the Plan Commission and denied the rezoning request, MHDC and minority
group individuals as prospective tenants of the proposed project filed suit in
federal district court. Their petition alleqed in separate counts that, first, the
rezoning denial deprived MHDC of the right to use its property in a reason-
able manner and, second, perpetuated racial segregation in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, of plaintiffs' civil rights under sections 1981,8
6. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
7. 373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). Facts
set forth in this section are taken from the court of appeals' opinion, Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1975).
8. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other." 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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1982,' and 198310 of Title 42 of the United States Code, and of the federal
Fair Housing Act."
The district court characterized MHDC's property right claim as "the
refusal of the Village to accommodate a landowner's desire to use his
property as he sees fit."'" Regarding the minority group plaintiffs' allega-
tion that the rezoning denial perpetuated racial segregation, the court stated
that the factual question was "whether the result of the defendant trustees'
action caused racial discrimination."' 3 While thus recognizing that plain-
tiffs' allegations raised both due process and equal protection issues, the
district court's decision did not address the constitutional issues separately,
nor did it clearly articulate the legal doctrine applicable to either issue. It
appears that the trial court applied an identical level of review in resolving
both constitutional challenges and therefore found it unnecessary to treat the
due process and equal protection issues separately.
9. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
10. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for red-
ress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
11. Relevant portions are set out below:
"As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by sections
3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful-
"(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
"(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection there-
with, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp.
V 1975).
"Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a
State or political subdivision of a State, or of any other jurisdiction in which this subchap-
ter shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by
this subchapter; but any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction
that purports to require or permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing prac-
tice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid." 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970).
"It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in
the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed or on
account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment
of, any right granted or protected by sections 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title. This
section may be enforced by appropriate civil action." 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970).
12. 373 F. Supp. at 209.
13. Id. at 210.
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Against a due process challenge, zoning ordinances and actions are
accorded a presumption of validity.14 The burden is on the challenger to
rebut this presumption"5 with what is generally regarded as an extraordinar-
ily difficult proof.16 As long as the zoning decision is reasonable and not
arbitrary the courts will not interfere. 7 This due process standard comports
with "traditional" equal protection doctrine:' 8 that a governmental action
will be upheld as long as it bears a "rational relationship" to a legitimate
governmental purpose.' 9 This standard of equal protection review has been
called "minimal scrutiny." In contrast to this lenient standard, a rigorous
standard of review is invoked if a governmental act is shown to affect
"suspect classes" 2 ° or to infringe upon a "fundamental interest."'" In such
cases the presumption of validity is abandoned and the burden is placed on
the defendant to prove that the action furthers a "compelling governmental
14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); Rogers v.
Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951); R. ANDERSON, 1 AMERICAN LAW
OF ZONING 104-08 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
15. See National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d
33, 83 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 946 (1968); Rosseau v. Building
Inspector of Framingham, 349 Mass. 31, 206 N.E.2d 399 (1965); Town of Bedford v.
Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973); AN-
DERSON, supra note 14, at 109-10.
16. See ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 11i-12, and cases cited therein.
17. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926); ANDERSON,
supra note 14, at 104-05.
18. See Sager, supra note 1.
19. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
20. Classes identified as "suspect" include race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9
(1967); national origin or ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948);
illegitimacy, compare Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) with Jiminez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 629 (1974); and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372, 376 (1971). However, alienage is only categorically suspect when state statutes in-
volve such a classification. Compare Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) (invalidating "state" stafute, Puerto Rico being considered a state, 426 U.S. at
597) with Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding federal statute). But see
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), which indicated that actions of federal
agencies, as opposed to presidential or congressional acts, that discriminate against aliens
may violate the Fifth Amendment. Whether sex has been recognized as a suspect classifi-
cation appears to be doubtful. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) with Craig v.
Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
21. Fundamental interests include voting rights, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
336 (1972); right to interstate travel or migration, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942);
access to the courts, especially for criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956); and any right "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the constitution," San An-
tonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). Specifically ex-
cluded from consideration as fundamental interests are housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972), and education, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
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interest"22 and that no means less detrimental to the interests of the plaintiff
are available to further that interest.23 This standard of review necessitates a
court's strict scrutiny. 4
The district court in Arlington Heights grappled with the equal protec-
tion issue, noting that the plaintiffs had claimed that the village's decision
was "motivated at least in part by racial discrimination." 5 The district
judge stated that "motives are irrelevant if the effect is illegal.''26 Finding
that the village's refusal to rezone in order to permit low income housing did
not affect racial minorities per se, the district judge concluded that "[p]lain-
tiffs have failed to carry their burden of proving discrimination by defend-
ants against racial minorities as distinguished from the under-privileged
generally."27 In regard to the motivation question, the trial court observed
that opposition by segments of the village citizenry might have been directed
at "minority or low-income groups . . .but the circumstantial evidence
does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated the defendants.'"28 Find-
ing no suspect classification involved, the district court apparently applied
the minimal scrutiny rational basis test, stating that the question was
"whether defendants can be required to zone any real estate for multi-family
dwellings if they have good faith reasons for not doing so.''29 The court
found such reasons in the evidence showing that a multiple family develop-
ment would damage surrounding property values, and that the rezoning
denial adhered to the village's zoning plan, which limited multiple family
residential use to "buffer zones" between different use districts. As all the
land surrounding MHDC's parcel was a uniformly zoned single family
dwelling district, there did not exist any distinct land use zones in the area
between which MHDC's land could act as a buffer.3" Thus, apparently
dispensing with both the equal protection and due process challenges, the
court concluded that "[t]he weight of the evidence proves that the defend-
ants were motivated. . . by a legitimate desire to protect property values
22. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
23. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974).
24. This brief summary, although identifying the most widely accepted aspects of
equal protection doctrine, is "a simplification of a complex and still evolving area of con-
stitutional law. Recent Supreme Court cases indicate the risk of oversimplification. For
example, the opinions in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), indicate that some mem-
bers of the Court may be evolving a third standard of review between minimal and strict
scrutiny for equal protection analysis (see Justice Powell's discussion in his concurring
opinion, 97 S. Ct. at 463-64). Additionally, as indicated by United Jewish Organizations
v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977), involving the deliberate creation of black majorities in
legislative districts, deliberate racial classifications may be upheld in some contexts if
created in order to remedy the effects of past discrimination.
25. 373 F. Supp. at 210.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 211.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan. This is not an arbitrary or
capricious act in derogation of the plaintiffs' 14th Amendment rights." 31
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed." By means of a
relatively complex analytical approach, the appellate court arrived at a con-
clusion contrary to the district court's preliminary finding that the refusal to
rezone was racially neutral. Relying on a recent decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit,33 the court of appeals determined that the
village's decision was properly judged by an analysis of its "historical
context and ultimate effect." 34 The court took judicial notice of the histori-
cal fact of housing segregation in the Chicago area, the shift of employment
opportunities from the central city to the suburbs, and the lack of adequate,
affordable housing for minorities in the vicinity. 5 Although agreeing that no
action directly attributable to the village had created the pattern of segre-
gated housing, the court of appeals stated that the village could not ignore
the situation, and noted that Arlington Heights had never assisted in de-
veloping low income housing and had no future plans to do so.36 The court
characterized the village's conduct as "exploiting the problem by allowing
itself to become an almost one hundred percent white community," 37 and
held that the village was under an affirmative duty to alleviate segregation in
the area.38 Failure to meet this obligation provided the racially discriminat-
ory effect that the district court did not find.
Because the Village has so totally ignored its responsibilities in the past
we are faced with evaluating the effects of governmental action that has
rejected the only present hope of Arlington Heights making even a small
contribution toward eliminating the pervasive problem of segregated
housing. We therefore hold that under the facts of this case Arlington
Heights' rejection of the [housing project] proposal has racially dis-
criminatory effects. 9
Finding that the village's decision involved the suspect classification of
race, the court of appeals subjected the decision to strict scrutiny, stating
that "[i]t could be upheld only if it were shown that a compelling public
interest necessitated the decision."4 The court had no difficulty in finding
31. Id.
32. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). In Kennedy Park, the rezoning of the pro-
posed site of a low cost housing project as park land was found to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, in contrast to the characterization of the municipality's decision in
Arlington Heights, the zoning decision in Kennedy Park was found to be racially moti-
vated. 436 F.2d at 109.
34. 517 F.2d at 413.
35. Id. at 413-14 & nn.1 & 2.
36. Id. at 414.
37. Id.
38. Id.




that the asserted interests of maintaining the integrity of the zoning plan and
protecting neighboring property values were not compelling interests.4
Consequently the court held the village's refusal to grant the zoning change
was a violation of the equal protection clause, and reversed the district
court.4" The village appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.43
IH. The Supreme Court Decision
A. The Requirement of Purposeful Discrimination
The Supreme Court approached the preliminary issue, a showing of
racial discrimination, with a more sharply focused inquiry than the courts
below. The Court stated that the first question (and, as a result of the answer
it reached, the only question the Court considered in the case) was whether
plaintiffs had proved discriminatory purpose on the part of the defendants.44
The Court indicated that, although plaintiffs had erroneously proceeded on
the theory that proof of discriminatory effect was sufficient, the courts
below had nonetheless recognized the need to "examine the purpose under-
lying the [Village's] decision." 4' The district judge had determined that the
evidence did not support a conclusion that racial discrimination had moti-
vated the defendants, and the court of appeals had upheld the trial court's
finding as being not "clearly erroneous."46 The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals because "[r]espondents simply failed to carry their burden
of proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the Vil-
lage's decision." 4' According to the Court, proof of discriminatory purpose
was a well-established principle in equal protection doctrine which the Court
had "reaffirmed" during the previous term in Washington v. Davis."
The plaintiffs in Davis had alleged that use of a written test by the
District of Columbia as a portion of the selection procedure for police
officers denied black applicants due process and equal protection of the law
41. Id.
42. Chief Judge Fairchild dissented. While agreeing with the majority that if the
village's decision eliminated the possibility of low cost housing being constructed in Ar-
lington Heights, the village would have unconstitutionally perpetuated segregation, Judge
Fairchild did not find that this was the case. He noted that the Village had zoned other
land for multiple family dwellings, and concluded that land was available to the plaintiffs
and that the village had not, therefore, "rejected the only present hope" of introducing
integrated housing into the Village. 517 F.2d at 415-16. On appeal, however, the Su-
preme Court specifically found that "no other R-5 [multiple family dwelling] parcels in
the Village were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price." 97 S. Ct. at 560.
43. 423 U.S. 1030 (1975).
44. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555,
563 (1977).
45. Id. at 565.
46. 517 F.2d at 412.
47. 97 S. Ct. at 566.
48. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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under the Fifth Amendment" because the test disqualified four times as
many black applicants as white applicants. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that use of the test was unconstitutional, applying
a Title VII standard,5" which that court considered interchangeable with the
proper equal protection standard. 1
The Supreme Court distinguished the statutory standard and the con-
stitutional standard, and applied the more lenient constitutional standard
because the Court had "not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact."5 Regardless of the statutory standard Congress may have adopted
for employment discrimination, the Court was "not disposed" to adopt such
a rigid standard as a test of constitutionality. Before triggering the "strict
scrutiny" form of the equal protection test, a racial classification must be
shown to be intentionally discriminatory.53
The Court warned of the potential consequences of leaving equal pro-
49. The complaint was based on the Fifth Amendment because a federal instrumen-
tality was involved and at the time the complaint was filed Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-15 (1970), was not applicable to the federal govern-
ment.
50. The court, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), stated
that "[o]nce it is shown that a particular selection procedure has an exclusionary effect on
minority applicants, there is a heavy burden on the employer to show that discriminatory
procedure 'bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for
which they were used.'
". .. We reach the same conclusion [as the district court] on the basis of the ra-
cially disproportionate impact that Test 21 is shown to have. . . . [A]nd finding Test 21
not otherwise demonstrated to be job related, we hold that appellees have not met their
burden." 512 F.2d at 959 (citations omitted).
51. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957 n.2 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). As interpreted in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), Title VII
provides that use of any selection device having a racially disparate impact creates a
prima facie case of discrimination. The employer using the device may only overcome the
presumption of discrimination by going forward with proof that use of the device is a
"business necessity," that is, that the device accurately distinguishes those who will per-
form the job well from those who will not, and that no other device having a less dispa-
rate effect is available. The analogy to "strict scrutiny" under equal protection analysis is
apparent. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. 426 U.S. at 239 (emphasis in original). In support of its claim that discriminat-
ory purpose was a long standing requirement, the Court cited jury selection cases includ-
ing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
and Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). The Court also cited cases in "other con-
texts," i.e., congressional reapportionment on racial lines, Wright v. Rockefeller, 376
U.S. 52 (1964); school desegregation, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973); and challenges to a state system of distributing Social Security benefits, Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 426 U.S. at 239-41.
53. 426 U.S. at 242.
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tection challenges unfettered by the intent requirement:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless in-
valid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more bur-
densome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent
white.54
As proof that its concern in this regard was not idle, the Court cited and
disapproved numerous lower court decisions (including Arlington Heights,
then still awaiting oral argument before the Supreme Court) which failed to
require a showing of purposeful discrimination.55
In accepting a demonstration of discriminatory impact as proof of im-
permissible discrimination, it can be argued that the lower courts recognized
the intent requirement, but were applying a definition of intent analogous to
the definition long recognized in tort law.56 As Justice Stevens pointed out in
his concurring opinion inDavis: "Frequently the most probative evidence of
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than the
evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his
deeds. ' ' 57 In disapproving this approach, the majority in Davis apparently
recognized that, in an equal protection case, use of such a definition of intent
effectively begs the question. If the government is presumed to intend the
natural or foreseeable consequences of its acts, evidence that a governmental
act operates in a manner imposing a greater burden on one race than on
another would at the same time indicate that the resulting discrimination was
ipso facto intentional. This result would make a nullity of the discriminatory
54. Id. at 248.
55. Id. at 244-45 & n.12.
56. "[W]here a reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be dealt with by the jury, or
even by the court, as though he had intended it." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 32 (4th
ed. 1971). "Intent is not, however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the
actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his
act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce
the result .... ."RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, comment b at 15.
57. 426 U.S. at 253. For cases applying the tort concept of intent, see Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (applying tort concept to interpret "under color of law"
in 42 U.S.C. § 1979 (1970)); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37,
50-51 (2d Cir. 1975) (equating de jure with tort concept of intent); and Johnson v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and re-
manded, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency,
532 F.2d 380, 388, 390 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976), where the court of appeals specifi-
cally found de jure segregation on the basis that it was.foreseeable that segregation would
result from application of a neighborhood school policy in an area of segregated housing.
The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Davis.
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purpose requirement, since every governmental act caring a disparate racial
effect would be automatically held intentionally discriminatory.
B. The Mechanics of Proving Discriminatory Purpose
Although stating a requirement that proof of discriminatory purpose be
shown in order to sustain an equal protection challenge, the Court in Davis
did not delineate what was required to make this showing.58 In Arlington
Heights the Court provided clearer guidance on the issue of discriminatory
purpose. It indicated that it was a question of fact, outlined the operation of
the burden of proof, and listed possible evidentiary factors appropriate to a
determination of the issue.59
Perhaps considering it unnecessary to do so, the Court did not explicitly
state whether inquiry into discriminatory purpose was to be resolved as a
matter of law or as a question of fact. However, by its statement that purpose
is determined by analysis of various evidentiary factors,6" and its own re-
view of the evidence adduced at trial in order to decide the issue,61 the Court
made it clear that the question of purpose is to be resolved by the trier of
fact. In a footnote, 2 the Court stated that the burden is on the plaintiff to
make a threshold showing that the defendant's purpose was in part dis-
criminatory. If the plaintiff is successful the burden shifts to the defendant to
establish that, despite the consideration of the impermissible purpose, the
same decision would nonetheless have been reached. If the defendant suc-
cessfully carries this burden, the court may not "interfere with the defend-
ant's decision," since the plaintiff then could not "attribute the injury
complained of to improper consideration of a discriminatory purpose. '"63
The Court listed a variety of evidentiary factors properly considered in
determining the decisionmaker's purpose, stating that its list was not exhaus-
tive.64 The Court assigned no absolute weight to any single factor, impliedly
leaving the outcome to an evaluation of all evidence adduced in a particular
case. In its list the Court distinguished between circumstantial and direct
evidence, the former including disproportionate impact as "an important
58. The Court intimated that invidiously discriminatory application, systematic exc-
lusion, or an "absence of Negroes [combined] with racially non-neutral selection proce-
dures" may suffice but the Court failed to define any of these terms, beyond citing the
well known case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and providing a group of
jury selection cases as examples, including Alexander v. Louisiana. 405 U.S. 625 (1972);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 559 (1953); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); and Neal v. De-
laware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 426 U.S. at 241.
59. See notes 66-71 and accompanying text infra.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 564-65.
61. See text accompanying notes 78-86 infra.
62. 97 S. Ct. at 566 n.21.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 564-65.
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starting point," but, except in rare cases, not sufficient in and of itself to
support a plaintiff's burden.65 Other circumstantial evidence could include
"a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,""6 the "histori-
cal background of the decision,"6 " the "specific sequence of events leading
65. Id. at 564.
66. Id. As illustrations of "clear pattern" the Court cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268 (1939); and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Yick Wo involved the
administration of a San Francisco ordinance requiring permits to operate laundries in
wooden buildings. Under the ordinance 200 out of 200 Chinese applicants were denied
permits, while 79 out of 80 white applicants were granted permits. 118 U.S. at 374.
Guinn held a provision of the Oklahoma Constitution violative of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment because it imposed a literacy test for voting, but exempted all persons and their
lineal descendants who were entitled to vote on January 1, 1866, i.e., prior to the adop-
tion of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court found the Oklahoma provision to be an at-
tempt to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment, the effect being to subject all blacks, but
few, if any whites, to the literacy test requirements. Wilson involved an Oklahoma voter
registration statute which automatically registered all persons who had voted in the general
election of 1914 (held under the unconstitutional provision in Guinn) and required all
others to register within a specified eleven day period or be forever disenfranchised. The
"grandfather" provision and the short registration period were found to "operate un-
fairly" against blacks in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 307 U.S. at 277. Gomill-
ion invalidated as violative of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments the gerryman-
dered adjustment of the city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama in a manner which placed all
but four black voters outside the city limits, while affecting no white voters. For a recent
case finding that statistical underrepresentation on juries created a prima facie case of ra-
cial discrimination, see Casteneda v. Partida, 45 U.S.L.W. 4302 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1977).
67. 97 S. Ct. at 564. As examples of "historical background" the Court cited Lane
v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), discussed in note 66 supra; Griffin v. County School
Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (following federal court desegregation order, closing of public
schools, indirect grants and tax relief to all-white private schools held unconstitutional);
Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949);
and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Schnell invalidated an amend-
ment to the Alabama Constitution which required that only those who could "understand
and explain" any article of the United States Constitution could be registered to vote. In
the county in question, although the population was 64% white and 36% black, approxi-
mately 104 blacks and 2800 whites were registered to vote under the requirement. In re-
gard to the history of the constitutional amendment, the Court noted that the campaign to
adopt the amendment followed the decision in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944),
declaring that Democratic primaries could no longer be limited to white voters. The
Alabama State Democratic Committee led the campaign for adoption "to make the
Democratic Party in Alabama the 'White Man's Party.' " The state bar journal carried
articles stating that the purpose of the amendment was "to give Registrars arbitrary power
to exclude Negroes from voting," which purpose was openly declared in proponents'
campaign literature. 81 F. Supp. at 876, 878, 880. Keyes held that intentional segregation
of one portion of the school system through manipulation of attendance zones, for exam-
ple, required the school.district to prove that discriminatory intent did not motivate segre-
gation in the remainder of the system. 413 U.S. at 207-13.
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up to the challenged decision,"68 "[d]epartures from'the normal procedural
sequence," 9 or "[s]ubstantive departures . . ., particularly if the factors
usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision
contrary to the one reached."" 0 Appropriate items of direct evidence include
the legislative or administrative history, minutes of the body's meetings,
reports, and "in some extraordinary instances" testimony by members of
the decisionmaking body as witnesses at trial.7
Though listed as separate and distinct evidentiary categories, several of
the factors relating to circumstantial evidence appear to be indistinguisha-
ble from one another. The Court cited one case, Lane v. Wilson,'2 to illus-
trate both "clear pattern," and "historical background," which indicates
that the same facts may fit within either category. Historical background
68. 97 S. Ct. at 564 & n.16. As examples of a "specific sequence of events" the
Court cited Reitman v. Mulkey; 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297
U.S. 233 (1936); Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961); and
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). Reitman invalidated a California constitutional amendment
intended to guarantee the right of any person "in his absolute discretion" to refuse to
sell, lease, or rent property to any other person. The Court noted that the amendment
nullified legislation passed in the prior five years that prohibited discrimination in hous-
ing, the most far reaching statute having been passed only the year before the amendment
had been adopted as a referendum measure. 387 U.S. at 370-74. Grosjean invalidated a
Louisiana tax of 2% of the gross receipts of any publisher of a periodical with a weekly
circulation of more than 20,000. Against a First Amendment challenge, the tax was held
to be an unconstitutional device to limit the circulation of information. The "events"
cited in the opinion are the enactment of the English and Massachusetts newspaper Stamp
Acts, and the adoption of the First Amendment. 297 U.S. at 245-49. Progress Dev.
Corp. invalidated an action condemning the plaintiff's land for a park, the action being
taken after the plaintiffs made known their intention to assure integration of their planned
housing development. Kennedy Park declared unconstitutional the City of Lackawanna's
declaration of a moratorium on new subdivisions and the rezoning of plaintiff's land as a
park and recreational area. When the Archdiocese of Buffalo announced its sale of the
property to plaintiff as a site for an integrated housing project in an all-white area, peti-
tions signed by the mayor and city council were circulated opposing the sale. 436 F.2d at
110-11. After the Justice Department intervened, the moratorium and rezoning were resci-
nded, but the mayor refused to sign plaintiff's application for a sewer extension for the
subdivision. 436 F.2d at 112.
69. 97 S. Ct. at 564. Apparently considering this factor to be self-explanatory, the
Court offered no illustration or explanation of procedural departures.
70. Id. at 564 & n.17. The Court cited Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970), in which the city refused to rezone land from its former use as a public
facility, a school, to a low density residential area to allow construction of a low income
project. All the adjacent land was zoned high-density residential, and the former and pre-
sent planning directors testified that there was no justification based on zoning consid-
erations to refuse the rezoning. Id. at 1040.
71. 97 S. Ct. at 565. The Court recognized that testimony by members of the de-
cisionmaking body may be barred by privilege.
72. 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See note 66 supra.
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also appears to overlap considerably with "specific sequence of events." 7
The Court stated that historical background is particularly significant if it
"reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes."7 4 Such a
series of actions would as well constitute a sequence of events.
Further, to illustrate the concept of sequence of events, the Court in
Arlington Heights cited Grosjean v. American Press.5 Grosjean fails to
elucidate any events leading to the Louisiana legislation in question in that
case. Instead, it discussed the eighteenth century newspaper Stamp Acts in
England and Massachusetts and the adoption of the First Amendment, which
would more appropriately be considered historical background. 6
Although the labels chosen by the Court in categorizing the appropri-
ately considered evidence are subject to criticism, these labels are of sec-
ondary importance. Of primary importance is the Court's purpose in setting
forth these evidentiary factors, which is to indicate the proper scope of the
inquiry into the purpose underlying a challenged governmental action.7"
C. The Court's Application of the Checklist to the Evidence Before It
Although its emphasis and analytical approach differed from that of the
district court, the Supreme Court's review of the evidence led it to conclude
that the trial court was correct in finding that the village's decision was not
racially motivated. Of the factors the Court listed as appropriate for consid-
eration, the only one found to support the plaintiffs' allegation was an
"arguably" racially disproportionate impact in the village's refusal to re-
zone.7" All the other factors considered by the Court militated against a
finding of discriminatory purpose. The circumstantial evidence raised no
inference of improper purpose. As to the "sequence of events," the land in
question had been zoned for single family dwellings since the village first
enacted a zoning ordinance.79 No procedural departures were proved, 8 nor
were any "substantive departures" found, as single family residences con-
stituted the clearly dominant and preferred land use in the village, 8  no
"novel criteria" were applied by the decisionmaker, 2 and the buffer zone
73. See notes 67-68 supra.
74. 97 S. Ct. at 564.
75. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). See note 68 supra.
76. See note 67 supra.
77. Of greater importance than the Court's somewhat arbitrary categorizations are
the implications of the Court's choice of illustrations. In the cases chosen by the Court as
illustrative, the evidence raised very strong inferences of discriminatory intent. The Court
leaves unclear whether more subtle fact patterns could also raise judicially cognizable in-
ferences of intent.
78. 97 S. Ct. at 565.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 566.
81. Id. at 565-66.
82. Id. at 566.
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policy governing multiple family residences had been consistently applied.83
The direct evidence similarly raised no suspicion of discriminatory
purpose. Statements by members of the Plan Commission and village Board
contained in the minutes of their meetings reflected the local bodies' con-
centration on the zoning considerations involved, s" not concern with the
"social issue" which the Court phrased as "the desirability or undesirability
of introducing. . . low and moderate income housing, housing that would
probably be racially integrated.''85 Moreover, the testimony of the one
Board member called as a witness in the trial raised no "inference of
invidious purpose." 8
From this consideration of the evidence, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to make a threshold showing that the defendants were
motivated by discriminatory purpose, and the constitutional question was
therefore answered: "This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The
court of appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried a dis-
criminatory 'ultimate effect' is without independant constitutional signifi-
cance. "87 The Court remanded the case for the court of appeals' determina-
tion of the statutory claims left unanswered.8"
Of the eight Justices participating in the case, 9 only Justice White,
who wrote the opinion in Davis, dissented from the majority's analysis of
the constitutional issue." Justice Marsball, joined by Justice Brennan, con-
curred in the majority's opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. They
dissented only on the basis that the entire case, not just the statutory claims,
should have been remanded to the court of appeals, because it required a
factual determination. 9
HI. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Evidentiary Review
The Davis and Arlington Heights requirement of proof of discrimina-
tory purpose stems from the distinction between de facto and de jure segre-
gation, although the Court did not mention the familiar terms. As stated in
Keyes v. School District No. 1,92 "the differentiating factor between de jure
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 559.
86. Id. at 566.
87. Id.
88. Id. See notes 8-11 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of relief
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), against a denial of rezon-
ing, see Annot., 12 A.L.R. FED. 964.
89. Justice Stevens, who was a member of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit when the case came before the court, took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.
90. 97 S. Ct. at 567.
91. Id. at 566-67.
92. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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and so-called defacto segregation. . is purpose or intent to segregate." 93
Although purporting merely to reemphasize this distinction between permis-
sible and impermissible segregation, the Court in Arlington Heights refor-
mulated the intent or purpose requirement of equal protection doctrine. The
Court phrased the issue as whether "discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor" behind the governmental act.94 The term "motivating
factor" is an unfortunate choice, as it would appear to require determination
of the decisionmaker's motive, not merely his purpose.
The proposition has long been recognized, if not invariably reiterated,
that legislators' motives are beyond the purview of the courts. 95 If taken at
face value, the Arlington Heights formula would require the plaintiffs to
prove that the defendants were at least partially motivated by intent to
discriminate. Defendants' burden would then be to prove that other motives
would have led to the same decision, involving both parties in an exercise
that the Supreme Court has long eschewed as too hazardous or dubious for
the judiciary to undertake.9"
Notwithstanding the language it used, however, the Court in Arlington
Heights required no more than exploration of the decisionmaker's purpose.
With one exception,9" all the factors listed as appropriately considered are
commonly applied in determining legislative purpose for statutory interpre-
tation,98 none of which requires direct inquiry into the decisionmaker's state
93. Id. at 208. Since its decision in Keyes, the Supreme Court has apparently
avoided the use of the term "de facto," instead basing its discussion of cognizable segre-
gation on the idea that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of
the [constitutional] violation." Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (quoting
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). See also Austin
Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976), discussed at note 57
supra. For a discussion of the relationship between the de facto/de jure distinction and the
requirement of discriminatory purpose, see Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board:
Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976).
94. 97 S. Ct. at 563, 566 & n.21.
95. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Developments, supra note
2, at 1091-1101. The Court in Arlington Heights noted this prohibition. 97 S. Ct. at 565
n. 18, 566 & n.20. However, while noting the prohibition on inquiry into motive, the
Court in discussing the matter appears to contradict itself. First the Court suggests that
direct evidence of purpose may be obtained by calling a decisionmaker as a witness at
trial. 97 S. Ct. at 565. This would appear to be helpful only to inquire into the decision-
maker's subjective state of mind, i.e., motivation. In footnote 18, however, the Court
observes that because inquiry into motive is improper, "[placing a decisionmaker on the
stand is therefore 'usually to be avoided.' " Then, stating that the testimony of the one
Village Board member called by MHDC as a witness raised "no inference of invidious
purpose," the Court states in footnote 20 that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in forbidding plaintiffs to question the members of the Board "about their motivation at
the time they cast their votes."
96. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
97. As indicated in note 95 supra, the Court's suggestion that the decisionmaker be
called as a witness indicates a belief in the efficacy of inquiry into subjective motivation.
98. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1077-83.
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of mind. Perhaps the Court's choice of words was intended to place addi-
tional emphasis on the principle that only willful discrimination is prohi-
bited. Evenhanded application of legislation that is racially neutral on its
face will not give rise to a constitutional challenge should an unforeseen or
unintended racially disparate impact result. This being the case, "purposeful
discrimination" would have been a less misleading phrase than "dis-
criminatory purpose as a motivating factor."
Although its phrasing of the issue was too broad, the scope of the
Court's inquiry into purpose in Arlington Heights was too restricted. Beyond
the factors the Court included in its review of the evidence, three additional
factors particularly appropriate in zoning cases ought also to have received
attention: the reasonableness of the criteria applied by the decisionmakers,
expressed community sentiment, and the historical background or context of
the decision.99
The Court examined the "substantive" basis of the village's decision
to the extent of finding that the criteria relied upon were not "novel." 1"0 The
Court should have carried its examination further to determine if these
criteria were "reasonable not arbitrary."'' Here, a buffer policy restricting
all multiple family residences to areas between single family residence zones
and other zones, for example, industrial or commercial zones, was invoked
to support the denial of rezoning. But the multiple family residences in
question here were not high density apartments. The project would have
consisted of twenty two-story buildings on fifteen acres of land, sixty per-
cent of which was to be left as open space. Furthermore, provision was to be
made for a screen of trees and shrubs for the benefit of neighboring
houses. 10' Consequently, the effects of the proposed project on the popula-
tion density and physical and aesthetic character of the area would appear to
be substantially similar to the effects of constructing single family resi-
dences. The Court might have questioned whether application of the buffer
policy to exclude such a development from an area of small lot single family
residences bore any "rational relationship" to a legitimate governmental
purpose.
By accepting application of the buffer policy as evidence refuting dis-
criminatory purpose while at the same time leaving the reasonableness of the
application unquestioned, the Court interposed due process and equal pro-
tection values. It is well settled that in a due process challenge the land-
owner's property rights may be appropriately subordinated to the local gov-
ernment's determination of what best furthers the public's general wel-
99. The Court listed historical background as a factor but made no mention of it in
its review of the evidence. See text accompanying notes 112-19 infra.
100. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
101. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1. 6 (1974).
102. See 97 S. Ct. at 559; 517 F.2d at 411.
[Vol. 4
SUBURBAN EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
fare."'3 Consequently, the judiciary appropriately refrains from second-
guessing the local decisionmaker's choice of where to draw legislative lines
in order to avoid having courts serve as zoning boards of appeals in due
process challenges. But the Court in Arlington Heights recognized that "the
heart of this litigation has never been the claim that the Village's decision
fails the generous Euclid [due process] test . . .Instead, it has been the
claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates against racial
minorities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."' In an equal protec-
tion challenge courts must balance the asserted governmental interests
against individual rights which the courts have held in a more Solicitous
regard than private economic or property interests.0 5 This balance is unduly
weighted in the government's favor by first presuming the validity of zoning
policies or ordinances upon a showing of any conceivable relationship be-
tween the policy or ordinance and the broad concepts of the public health,
safety, or general welfare, and then accepting application of the policy as
evidence that the government acted without discriminatory purpose. The
individual rights in question are thus overbalanced by even the most tangen-
tial furtherance of the public health, safety, or general welfare. Before the
application of a policy purporting to preserve neighboring property values or
the sanctity of single family residence zones is asserted to defeat claims of
racially discriminatory purpose, courts should require a strong showing that
the application of the policy in the particular case in question substantially
furthers those asserted interests.
An additional factor the Supreme Court should have considered in
determining the purpose behind the denial of rezoning is the basis of com-
munity opposition. Rezoning decisions are frequently reached through a
process which has been called "trial by neighborism. '"106 As stated by one
commentator, "It is a rare municipal legislature that will reject what it
believes to be the wishes of the neighbors."' 0 7 Given this tendency of local
zoning boards and town councils to abdicate to the local residents' views,
these community sentiments should be considered in determining the de-
cisionmaker's purpose.
In Arlington Heights the district judge surmised that strong opposition
to the rezoning petition by large segments of the Village populace might
have been motivated by "opposition to minority or low-income groups."'
0 8
103. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); notes 14-17 and accompanying
text supra.
104. 97 S. Ct. at 562.
105. Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) with Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974).
106. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 141 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BAB-
COCK].
107. Id.
108. 373 F. Supp. at 211.
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Consequently, the members of the Plan Commission and Village Board
must have been aware of the "social issue" raised," 9 even if they did not
directly address it. Expressed community opposition based on racial an-
tagonism should raise judicial suspicion of the decisionmaker's purpose in a
zoning decision.110 It may be argued that the connection between commun-
ity sentiment and the decisionmaker's purpose is too speculative for judicial
consideration. But community opposition has been considered in attributing
purpose in other cases approved by the Supreme Court.1" While perhaps not
determinative in Arlington Heights, local racial opposition should at least
have been included in the Court's analysis of the village's refusal to rezone.
The final evidentiary factor omitted by the Supreme Court is the histor-
ical context of the village's decision, a factor upon which the court of
appeals placed heavy emphasis in its assessment of the refusal to rezone.'
Despite listing historical background, which appears to be synonymous with
the lower court's term," 3 as an appropriate factor, the Supreme Court made
no mention of it in reviewing the evidence in Arlington Heights. This omis-
sion appears anomalous in view of prior Supreme Court reliance on histori-
cal background in other contexts. If the history of press censorship in Eng-
land and the colonies is appropriate to consideration of a First Amendment
challenge of a Louisiana publishing tax," 4 it would appear equally appropri-
ate to take cognizance of the all-white complexion of the local municipality
and the pervasive housing segregation in the metropolitan area in determin-
ing a Fourteenth Amendment challenge of a zoning decision.
The trend in some jurisdictions is to consider local zoning decisions
from a regional perspective."' This trend takes into account the fact that
land use and housing patterns in a metropolitan area are determined by the
109. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
110. See generally Branfman, supra note 1.
111. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436
F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); cf. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (state-wide referendum).
112. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 34-36, 67, 72-76 and accompanying text supra.
114. See Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); see note 68 supra.
115. E.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied
and appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); National Land & Inxestment Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See generally Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land
Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971); Walsh,
Are Local Zoning Bodies Required by the Constitution to Consider Regional Needs?, 3
CONN. L. REV. 244 (1971); Note, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs: Policy Formula-
tion and the Constitutionality of Municipal Growth-Restricting Plans, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 803, 814-18 (1976); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Ap-
proach, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (1966).
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practices of the conglomeration of municipalities comprising the region. If
the parochial interests of each small community are allowed to determine the
pattern, the general welfare of the region may be sacrificed."'
This regional perspective would have come before the Court in Ar-
lington Heights had the Supreme Court considered the historical background
of the village's decision to preclude the only present prospect of low cost,
racially integrated housing becoming available within the village.11 Viewed
in isolation, the purpose of a municipal refusal to rezone for low income
housing is more easily accepted as mere adherence to broad zoning policies.
The purpose may appear to be quite different when the decision is consid-
ered in the context of a history of rapid population expansion from the
central city to the suburbs in which the outward migration is restricted to
relatively affluent whites. 1 8 Recognizing that zoning is the primary munici-
pal tool for preserving what is called the character of the community, it
seems an obvious question whether one of the purposes of a local decision
precluding construction of integrated housing was to preserve the all-white
complexion of the community. While the Supreme Court disapproved the
court of appeals' use of historical context to determine the "ultimate effect"
of the village's decision, that is, the finding that the local decision had the
effect of continuing an historical pattern of housing segregation, 9 historical
context is nonetheless relevant and necessary to provide a realistic perspec-
tive on the local decision. By failing to consider this factor in Arlington
Heights, the purpose of the village's decision was viewed in a sociological
and historical vacuum disadvantageous to plaintiffs.
IV. Analysis of the Purpose Requirement
The Supreme Court's adherence to a narrow focus in Arlington Heights
reflects a concern with the potential reach of equal protection review. As it
indicated in Washington v. Davis,"' the Court is determined that equal
protection doctrine should not become a vehicle for active intervention in a
multiplicity of governmental activities, allowing the doctrine to become an
unhamessed leveler of American society. The near unanimity of support for
the formulation of the discriminatory purpose requirement in Arlington
Heights indicates the pervasive effect of this concern on the present Court.
Regardless of whether the Burger Court's concern in this regard is war-
ranted, the means it chose to limit the reach of equal protection doctrine-
increasing the burden on challengers-is indicative of a shift in values from
the attitudes of the Warren Court.
116. See BABCOCK, supra note 106, at 145-50, 174-79.
117. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
118. Cf. S. KAPLAN, THE DREAM DEFERRED 16-17, 102-103 (1976); Siembeida,
Suburbanization of Ethnics of Color, ANNALS 118, 119 (Nov. 1975).
119. 97S. Ct. at 566.
120. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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As the doctrine of substantive equal protection12' was developed during
the previous decade it effectively presented an all or nothing choice to the
courts. Because the judiciary is expected to exercise considerable imagina-
tion in construing a permissible purpose to legislation and official acts under
minimal scrutiny, this form of the equal protection test effectively requires
firm judicial deference to governmental action.'22 In contrast, governmental
interests considered sufficiently "compelling" to sustain state action under
strict scrutiny are extremely rare. 2 ' Consequently, under the mechanical
formalism of substantive equal protection analysis, the crucial question is
whether strict scrutiny is triggered by a finding that a suspect classification
or fundamental interest is involved. As a result equal protection would
theoretically invalidate a municipal action denying equal access to public
parks on the basis of race,' 24 while upholding a statute that denied decent
housing, employment, and educational opportunities on the basis of
wealth.''
Rather than address the problem as an overly rigid dichotomy of re-
view, the Court in Arlington Heights left the two-tiered standard of review
intact, adopting the expedient of placing a uniform hurdle to invocation of
strict scrutiny. A showing that a governmental act classifies by race and,
presumably, that it involves other suspect classifications or that it infringes a
fundamental interest will not trigger strict scrutiny, regardless of the severity
of the detriment involved, until the challenger proves the defendant acted
with discriminatory purpose. Only, if the defendant fails to prove other
overriding purposes will strict scrutiny be applied.
Alternatives were available to the Court which might have limited the
potential reach of equal protection review while raising less danger that the
essential societal values represented by the equal protection clause would
suffer diminution for lack of proof of transgressors' purposes. The Court
could have abandoned the bifurcated standard altogether, adopting a
"means-focused" flexible standard in its place. This was the approach
suggested by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.16 Under this approach the for-
121. See Winter, The Changing Parameters of Substantive Equal Protection: Prom
the Warren to the Burger Era, 23 EMORY L.J. 657, 664, 665 n.27 (1974), for a justifica-
tion of the term "substantive" equal protection as well as a condemnation of the doctrine
as equivalent to substantive due process.
122. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972).
123. Id.
124. Cf. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (requiring prompt de-
segregation of municipal parks).
125. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(Texas state school finance system did not discriminate against a suspect class nor did it
infringe upon any fundamental interest).
126. 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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malistic automatic triggering of strict scrutiny in any case involving a sus-
pect classification would be replaced with a more clearly enunciated balanc-
ing test than any the Court presently employs. The Court under this test
would require a varying degree of substantiality of relationship between
means and ends according to the degree to which a protected class or interest
is affected.
For example, where the voting rights of blacks were shown to be
adversely affected by a statute, the courts would refuse to use any imagina-
tion to find a justifying rationale for the law. 127 The state would have to
show that the legislation directly furthers a governmental goal that cannot be
fostered by alternative means. This is, in effect, strict scrutiny. But where an
ordinance affects one race's recreational opportunities more adversely than
another race's, the court could more readily construe the purpose to be
economic or related to the public safety. Allowing weight to be given to the
governmental interest and the substantiality of the relationship between that
interest and the legislative means chosen, while simultaneously weighing
the degree of detriment imposed on a protected class or interest, would
undoubtedly uphold many of the tax, welfare, regulatory, and other statutes
which the Davis Court feared might be invalidated under strict scrutiny.1 2
Although more cognizant of the spectrum of interests and values at
issue in equal protection litigation, this approach suffers from the disadvan-
tages of lack of predictability and guidance to potential litigants and lower
courts while retaining too much potential for active judicial interference in
an endless variety of governmental activities. To preserve present predicta-
bility of result while restricting the potential reach of equal protection doc-
trine, the Court could have emphasized purpose or intent without increasing
the burden on plaintiffs. As was suggested in an article cited in the Arlington
Heights opinion,"2 9 a much lower threshold showing of discriminatory pur-
pose could have been required. Convincing proof that consideration of a
discriminatory purpose may have affected the outcome of the decisionmak-
ing process should invalidate the decision. 3 ' If the objective is only "sus-
pect" the onus would be on the defendant to provide compelling justifica-
tion."'
This approach arguably partakes too much of the rigidity of strict
scrutiny. Perhaps the challenger should only be required to raise a reason-
able suspicion of discriminatory purpose, shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant to refute the suspicion. This approach comports with the
fact that it is easier to prove one's own purposes than for another to prove
127. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977).
128. 426 U.S. at 248 (1976). See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
129. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motives, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95.
130. Id. at 130-31.
131. Id. at 131.
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them, while simultaneously allowing the benefit of the doubt to governmen-
tal defendants in appropriate circumstances.
Arlington Heights indicates overwhelming concurrence among the
members of the Court that the reach of strict scrutiny under the officially
recognized two-tier equal protection standard must be restricted. Apparently
unable to reach consensus on any comprehensive redefinition or redirection
of equal protection doctrine, such as recognition of a median tier,'32 the
Court has settled on the expendient of increasing the burden of proof on
equal protection challengers in order to restrict the reach of activist judicial
review. The danger inherent in this resolution of the Court's concern arises
from its potential to debilitate the efficacy of equal protection doctrine as a
judicial tool to protect groups and interests otherwise at the mercy of the
majoritarian political process. 3
While one may empathize with the Court's problem in channeling the
evolution of equal protection, one may nonetheless question whether the
Supreme Court's determination that only discriminatory purpose falls within
the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment in and of itself requires the
degree of proof the Court has placed on challengers as a result of the
Arlington Heights decision. One would hope that while the Court struggles
with redefining the nature of equal protection, subsequent decisions will
result in an extension of the evidentiary factors considered, a decrease in the
threshold showing required of plaintiffs, and the burden of persuasion more
readily shifted to defendants under the Arlington Heights formula.
Conclusion
Whatever the ramifications of the Arlington Heights decision for equal
protection doctrine, the decision's significance for suburan zoning is more
readily ascertained. Whether or not suburban zoning practices are purpose-
fully pursued to assure racial and economic segregation, it would seem
unquestionable that these suburban practices at least tend to continue the
present exclusively white middle class character of the suburbs. Yet only a
deviation from the present policies and procedures, such as an application of
"novel criteria," will provide the basis for bringing suburban zoning under
active judicial review.
The impetus for active judicial review of municipal zoning stems from
the perception that no viable means of political redress are available to the
groups excluded by present zoning practices. Suburban decisionmakers
naturally act in conformity with the desires of their suburban constituency.
The same suburban residents who serve, or who select those who serve, on
planning commissions and town councils claim majority representation in
132. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
133. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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the state legislatures which delegate zoning authority to municipalities."'
As non-residents, those excluded by municipal zoning practices have no
voice in the councils which determine these practices and therefore have no
influence in changing the patterns and practices which exclude them. What-
ever the true purposes of suburban municipalities may be, it would be an
extremely rare zoning ordinance or decision that is not couched in terms of
fiscal concerns, property values, or sacrosanct zoning policies. The Su-
preme Court has determined that, before being accorded the only effective
judicial review available under equal protection doctrine, anyone challeng-
ing zoning decisions must first prove that the decisive purpose of the deci-
sion was to discriminate on the basis of race. But, absent inconsistent
application or deviation from present policies and procedures, such proof is
unlikely to be available.
Under the formula developed inArlington Heights the scales are weigh-
ted against the challenger. Absent an indiscrete remark by a planning com-
missioner or omission of the formality of a public hearing, a presumption of
validity will be granted to municipal actions which tend to perpetuate segre-
gation. Had the court of appeals' decision in Arlington Heights been af-
firmed, the consequences for metropolitan housing patterns, employment
opportunities, and nationwide school integration would have been moment-
ous. Presented with a case of potential social consequences at least as
significant as the issue in Brown v. Board of Education,35 the present
Supreme Court chose instead to insulate the affluent white suburbs from the
harsh spotlight of equal protection strict scrutiny, taking pains to instruct the
lower courts on the proper approach in future cases. In placing the burden on
challengers to make a difficult showing of discriminatory purpose, the Su-
preme Court apparently places different emphasis on equal protection than
did the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which recently stated that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not meant to assess blame but to prevent
injustice." 136 As Justice Marshall stated in his dissenting opinion in Jeffer-
son v. Hackney,' 37 "[A]t some point a showing that state action has a
devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be rele-
vant." 38 After Arlington Heights the question arises whether that point will
ever be reached in zoning practices.
134. See Boyd, Suburbia Provides the Balance of Power, NAT'L Civic REv. 613
(Dec. 1965); Boyd, Suburbia Takes Over, NAT'L Civic REv. 294-98 (June 1965).
135. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
136. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
137. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
138. Id. at 575-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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